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Section 1983, Statutes, and Sovereign Immunity
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
This Comment argues that a significant, but unnoticed, way around
state sovereign immunity has become available under current law. Although
sovereign immunity now generally prohibits actions against states for
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),' a plaintiff should
be able to use 42 U.S.C. § 19832 to seek damages from state officials for
ADA violations. Using the leading case on the topic, Alsbrook v. City of
Maumelle,4 the Comment will show that when the current Supreme Court
closed one door through its federalism cases, it opened another through
§ 1983.
It might appear that the Supreme Court's recent sovereign immunity
jurisprudence has all but eliminated Congress's power to subject states to
private damage actions for violations of federal statutes. In the line of cases
beginning with Seminole Tribe v. Florida,' and including Alden v. Maine,
6
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
2. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
3. Due to space constraints, this Comment discusses only the ADA. However, if one is
permitted to plead ADA violations through § 1983, one should also be permitted to use § 1983 to
enforce other federal statutes that have been held, on sovereign immunity grounds, to be
unenforceable against states via damage actions.
4. 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
5. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
6. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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the Court has consistently (if controversially) found that Congress has no
power under Article I of the Constitution to subject states to private damage
actions, in either federal or state courts, for violating federal statutes.
Although Congress retains power to subject states to damage suits by
individuals through its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,7 that
power has been reined in substantially in recent years by the line of cases
beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores8 and including Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett.9 The result is a number of important
federal statutes, including the ADA'0 (the subject of Garrett), in which
congressional schemes for private damage suits have been held invalid on
Eleventh Amendment grounds."' These statutes are theoretically still
legitimate legislation under the Commerce Clause, and states are still
obliged to obey them-and yet an injured party is unable to seek monetary
relief if they are violated. Countless commentators have noticed, and
lamented, this breach of the rule-of-law principle.'
2
Nonetheless, damage suits for violations of federal law that are in
essence suits against states happen all the time. They are suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 has been recognized since 196113 as providing
7. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Congress has the right to subject
states to damage actions when it is doing so through a valid use of its enforcement power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA is not valid Fourteenth Amendment
legislation and therefore could not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (1994).
11. Garrett held only that Title I of the ADA, which deals with employment discrimination
against the disabled, could not be enforced by private parties against states. It left open the
question of whether Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination against the disabled in
public services, is also unenforceable against the states. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1. Most circuits
have found, since Garrett, that Title II is not enforceable on Eleventh Amendment grounds, which
is an almost inevitable consequence of Garrett's logic. See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d
1020, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 983 (5th Cir. 2001);
Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2000) (questioning the continued
authority of Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997),
which upheld Title II as a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1190 (2001); Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1009-10; cf. Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d
698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a regulation enacted pursuant to Title II did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity). But see Kiman v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 301 F.3d 13, 24 (1st
Cir. 2002) (allowing Title II actions against states "at least as that Title is applied in cases in
which a court identifies a constitutional violation by the state"); Garcia v. SUNY Health Scis. Ctr.,
280 F.3d 98, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that Title II actions may be brought against states if
the "violation was motivated by discriminatory animus or ill will based on the plaintiff's
disability"); cf. Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 812, 815
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (agreeing that Title 11 is not a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity
when Congress is enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, but holding that it is permissible when
Congress is enforcing the Due Process Clause). Only the Ninth Circuit, in a remarkably brief
opinion, has asserted that Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity after Garrett.
See Hason v. Med. Bd., 279 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2001).
12. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden
Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000).
13. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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a way to sue state officials for damages stemming from violations of federal
law. The § 1983 damages suit proceeds under the legal fiction that one is
suing a state official in his individual capacity for a violation of § 1983.
Section 1983, in turn, creates no substantive rights; rather, it provides a
remedy against officials who act under color of state law to violate a right
guaranteed by federal law. The paradigm case for a § 1983 violation has
been a violation of the federal Constitution, and many commentators refer
to § 1983 cases as "constitutional torts.,
14 Ever since Maine v. Thiboutot,15
however, § 1983 has been read also to permit suits against state officials
acting in their individual capacities for violations of federal statutes. One
can sue a state official for violating a federal statute, just as one can sue the
official for violating a duty under the Constitution.
The key point, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, is the legal fiction
that § 1983 suits against individual officers are not suits against a state.
They thus do not, in theory, raise Eleventh Amendment issues at all. The
state, although it serves as the "deep pocket," is liable only indirectly,
usually through an indemnification contract or policy in which the state
implicitly or explicitly agrees to reimburse monetary judgments against its
officers. In this way, the courts have permitted what amounts to a modified
regime of tort liability for state governments that violate federal law.
If all of this is true-if the ADA still applies to the states, and if one can
plead statutory violations against state officials in their individual capacities
for violations of federal statutes-then why don't plaintiffs' lawyers simply
sue individual state officials under § 1983 for violating their obligations
under federal law? Instead of bringing a suit under the ADA directly against
a state, why not sue a state official under § 1983 for his violation of the
ADA? Such a method would limit the power of Seminole Tribe and render
cases like Garrett almost irrelevant in practice.
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle16 demonstrates why commentators 17 and
plaintiffs' lawyers have not embraced the § 1983 approach. In Alsbrook, the
14. See, e.g., William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts, 73
MINN. L. REv. 515, 516 (1989); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 53 (1998).
15. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
16. 184 F.3d 999. Another circuit has also rejected the notion that the ADA may be
separately pled under § 1983. See Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (1 1th Cir.
1997). However, this decision predates Garrett and circuit court decisions that have found Title II
of the ADA unenforceable on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Thus, Holbrook is not relevant for
the central issue raised by Alsbrook. The only § 1983/ADA circuit decision that postdates Garrett
comes from the Ninth Circuit, where direct actions against states may still be brought under Title
II of the ADA. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. See Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities After
Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 76-77 (2001) (claiming that § 1983 statutory enforcement suits to
enforce the ADA and similar statutes are probably barred by preemption); Pamela S. Karlan, The
Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1311, 1323-24 (2001) (same).
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plaintiff, an aspiring policeman, sued an Arkansas state agency for violating
Title II of the ADA. He also sued the agency's commissioners in their
individual capacities for violating § 1983 by failing to comply with their
obligations under Title II of the ADA. The agency had refused to waive a
vision requirement for local police hiring. Therefore, Alsbrook claimed, it
had denied him equal access to employment opportunities because of a
correctable disability. The Eighth Circuit saw the case as an opportunity to
explain why damage suits under the ADA are impermissible on sovereign
immunity grounds. First, the court (anticipating Garrett) found that the
ADA did not abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that, therefore, there could be no private damage action
under the ADA directly against a state. More importantly, however, the
Alsbrook court also rejected the claim that the suit could go forward as a
suit that pled the violation of the ADA through § 1983.
The court made two points. First, relying on a doctrine propounded by
the Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n,18 the court found that, because Congress had
developed a comprehensive remedial scheme under the ADA, it had
foreclosed the plaintiff's recourse to § 1983. Second, it held that because
individual state officials could not be sued directly under the ADA, § 1983
could not create a suit against officials "acting in their individual capacity,"
because such a suit would "expand" substantive rights under the ADA,
whereas § 1983 creates only "procedural" rights.
To understand why the Eighth Circuit's approach is misguided, we
must start with its misreading of Sea Clammers. Sea Clammers responded
to a practical problem that arose when, in Maine v. Thiboutot,19 the
Supreme Court decided that any federal statute could be pled through
§ 1983. This created a presumption that any federal statute could give rise
to a private right of action. But what of cases in which Congress, without
expressly foreclosing a cause of action under § 1983, had invested
considerable energy in developing a different remedial scheme? How
should courts read congressional intent in such cases? In Sea Clammers, the
Court modified the baseline presumption that a § 1983 suit would always be
available to enforce a federal statute. That case imposed the following
limitation: A separate "comprehensive remedial scheme" provided in a
statute is good evidence of congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983
action. 2 ) Thus, under this doctrine, § 1983 could not be used to enforce a
18. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
19. 448 U.S. 1.
20. 453 U.S. at 20. Sea Clammers involved an attempt to use § 1983 to enforce two acts
related to water pollution. The Court found that because these statutes already involved a number
of remedial provisions-including, most importantly, special citizen-suit provisions with
restrictive statutes of limitations--Congress could not have intended these statutes to be enforced
through § 1983. Id. at 8.
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statute when Congress had expressly established another mechanism for
private enforcement.
There are good reasons for the limits imposed by Sea Clammers.
Unbounded permissive pleading through § 1983 would allow anyone who
could demonstrate injury caused by a state's noncompliance with federal
law to bring a suit for damages, even where the federal law in question was
vague or did not give an enforceable right to an individual. The ironic result
might be a Congress wary of passing useful statutes for fear of giving rise
to unanticipated private enforcement.
What is clear from the cases, however, is that a showing of
congressional intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy is not easily made. The
Court has noted that "we do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy," 21 and has emphasized the
significance of the "burden" on the state to show that Congress foreclosed
the remedy.22 The strong presumption is that a § 1983 cause of action is
available to enforce a federal statute.
Before Garrett, there was a very good argument that the Sea Clammers
preemption doctrine prevented pleading the ADA through § 1983. Like the
environmental statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, the ADA contains express
provisions for citizen suits.23 As Cass Sunstein has explained, evidence that
Congress expressly designed a mechanism for the enforcement of private
rights demonstrates very convincingly that Congress has decided to
preempt a separate § 1983 cause of action.24 Why would Congress have
designed a particular statutory private remedy if it intended also to retain
the default § 1983 action? Before the recent wave of sovereign immunity
cases, courts used similar logic to find that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Rehabilitation Act preempt a § 1983 remedy.
25
The change in sovereign immunity doctrine, however, alters the Sea
Clammers analysis dramatically. After Garrett, the Sea Clammers bar to
pleading the ADA through § 1983 makes much less sense. If, as Thiboutot
tells us, there is a presumptive right to plead statutes through § 1983, that
presumption should spring back into force once an alternative congressional
remedy has been eliminated. There are at least two reasons why this should
be so. First, the major goal of Sea Clammers is ensuring consistency and
coherence in federal law. That goal evaporates once a statutory remedy has
been barred on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Permitting two remedies,
one under a statute and one under § 1983, might cause unbearable
21. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984).
22. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520-21 (1990).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,117, 12,133 (1994).
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI.
L. PEv. 394,427-28 (1982).
25. E.g., Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Rehabilitation
Act, which remains enforceable against the states, cannot be enforced through § 1983).
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confusion and frustrate a congressional enforcement scheme. Permitting a
§ 1983 enforcement mechanism once the statutory enforcement mechanism
has been struck down presents no such problem. Eliminating the original
statutory remedy on Eleventh Amendment grounds also eliminates the
problem Sea Clammers was designed to prevent.
Second, in the ADA, Congress has already made it clear that it wants a
private enforcement remedy that is quite similar to the § 1983 enforcement
suit. There is thus an irony to the A isbrook reading of Sea Clammers: When
Congress plainly states its intent to create a private cause of action, a court
will find that Congress foreclosed its only constitutionally permissible
means of creating such an action. This reading of congressional intent is
blind to the obvious. Congress, when it states that it would like to see a
private cause of action to enforce one of its laws, would rather have an
equivalent private cause of action in place than no remedy at all. The Sea
Clammers doctrine hinges on a court's assessment of congressional intent,
and it distorts the doctrine wildly to use it to prevent a private cause of
action where Congress has made plain that it wants one.
The Eighth Circuit in Alsbrook sought to find a way around this
problem by calling for a clear-statement rule. Congress, not the courts, it
reasoned, should speak clearly about the decision to permit pleading
through § 1983.26 The court found support for its theory of congressional
statement in Seminole Tribe. In that case, the Supreme Court found both
that Congress had no power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under a
provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,2 7 and that by creating an
elaborate remedial scheme under that provision, Congress intended to
preclude a remedy for injunctive relief under the Ex Parte Young
28
doctrine.29 The Court concluded that Congress, not the Court, should make
plain how the Act was to be enforced, and therefore refused to permit an Ex
Parte Young action even as it removed all other remedies under the Act.
But Seminole Tribe is distinguishable from Alsbrook. The Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act included a truly elaborate enforcement mechanism,
whereas the ADA's simpler remedial provision-a private suit for
damages-is very similar to the § 1983 remedy. More importantly, the
analogy ignores the fact that § 1983, unlike the judge-made law of the Ex
Parte Young doctrine, is a statute-a fact that must weigh heavily in any
26. 184 F.3dat 1011.
27. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
28. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
29. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996). Oddly, the Eighth Circuit itself now
seems to have retreated from an expansive interpretation of Seminole Tribe's rule on elaborate
remedial schemes preempting Ex Parte Young injunctive relief. In Gibson v. Arkansas
Department of Correction, 265 F.3d 718, 721-22 (8th Cir. 2001), that court found that Congress's
use of a remedial scheme to enforce the ADA was not intended to preempt the use of injunctive
relief for ADA violations under Ex Parte Young.
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serious attempt by a court to ascertain congressional intent. It is one thing to
hold, as the Court did in Seminole Tribe, that Congress should have made
clear whether or not it wished to have an intricate, complicated statute
enforced against states by means of a judicial fiction. It is quite another
thing to hold that such a clear-statement rule should prevent the application
of a statute already firmly written into law. To ask for a clear-statement rule
in the face of plain statutory law is not to exercise judicial restraint in the
face of an opaque congressional statute-it is to defy openly the plain intent
of the legislature.
More generally, the choice to require a clear-statement rule in this
situation reverses the Thiboutot presumption that federal statutes can be
pled through § 1983. If we really have a strong presumption that federal
statutes can be pled through § 1983, and preemption of that right is an
exception, then why should we ask Congress to provide a clear statement of
what is normally presumed? The Eighth Circuit's understanding transforms
Sea Clammers and Thiboutot beyond recognition. Alsbrook replaces a
presumption that any statute can be pled through § 1983 with a clear-
statement rule for the imposition of § 1983 liability, and reads a doctrine
designed to expand Congress's power as reducing it.
What, then, of the Eighth Circuit's second reason for refusing to permit
pleading through § 1983? The Alsbrook court found that because suits
cannot be brought against individuals under the ADA, § 1983 could not be
used to enforce the statute against individual state officials. Such a use of
§ 1983, the circuit court reasoned, would impermissibly grant new
"substantive" rights under the ADA via § 1983's purely "procedural"
remedy. 30 But this reasoning makes little sense. Although the ADA itself
does not provide a cause of action against an individual, there is no
reason-provided that a general remedial scheme has not otherwise
preempted the § 1983 suit-that § 1983 should not provide a cause of
action against an individual officer to facilitate enforcement of the law.
Section 1983 is then merely providing a means of enforcement, not adding
a substantive right. Indeed, almost all § 1983 suits against state officials are
brought under laws that do not, by their own terms, provide a direct right of
action against individual officials. Constitutional provisions target state
action, not individual officers. Nor do statutes under which plaintiffs have
for years pursued § 1983 actions specifically target individuals-the
provisions of the Social Security Act at issue in Thiboutot, for example, did
not create liability for individual officers.31 To call a § 1983 suit against an
30. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1011-12. The Eighth Circuit had never previously found that suits
against individuals were impermissible under Title II of the ADA, the portion of the ADA at issue
in the case. See id. at 1005 n.8.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1994).
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official for failure to comply with a federal law a "substantive" expansion
would be to undermine the entire law of § 1983.
Thus, the Alsbrook court's reasoning appears simply incorrect. Neither
the Sea Clammers doctrine nor any other provision prohibits pleading a
statute like the ADA through § 1983. Other circuits have not yet ruled on
this issue, and they should not repeat Alsbrook's mistakes. So long as they
avoid the Eighth Circuit's faulty reasoning, a functional equivalent of a
damages remedy under statutes like the ADA could well be preserved, even
after Seminole Tribe and Garrett.
One more point should be made. It is clear that Congress, if it so
desires, can expressly allow a § 1983 action to enforce a damages remedy.
There is, to be sure, little precedent for Congress doing so. Prior to
Seminole Tribe's holding that it lacked Article I power to impose private
damage remedies on the states, Congress had no reason to believe that any
damage remedy it imposed would not be enforced. It is clear, however, that
the Sea Clammers doctrine of § 1983 preemption is nothing more than
statutory interpretation. Thus, there is no reason why Congress cannot, if it
wishes, make clear that § 1983 suits against individual state officers are an
acceptable means of enforcing the ADA. Such an act would not raise
Eleventh Amendment concerns because the remedy would run against the
individual state official, not the state.32
Courts, lawyers, commentators, and Congress should recognize that
§ 1983 still gives individuals a way to recover damages for state violations
of important federal statutes. A link between right and remedy remains
intact.
-Nick Daum
32. In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court did hold that a § 1983 action against an officer was
barred on Eleventh Amendment grounds when it sought money directly "from the State's
treasury." 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). This doctrine has consistently been interpreted, however,
only to apply to situations in which the parties seek retroactive payment of benefits, such as back
pay or contract wages, and not to such tort-like violations as the ADA would remedy. See Jeffries,
supra note 14, at 61-68.
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